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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This dispute involves the sale of moldy hay by Mr. Jeff Good to Harry’s Dairy, LLC.

Despite moldy hay being dangerous for cattle—and a nonconforming good under the Uniform
Commercial Code—Mr. Good sold Harry’s Dairy a supply of moldy hay to feed dairy cattle. Mr.
Good, however, sued Harry’s Dairy for breach of contact for failing to haul and pay for this hay.
On summary judgment, numerous issues of fact existed—a scenario that is not uncommon under
the UCC’s flexible doctrine governing contracts for the sale of goods. When confronted with
issues of material fact, the district court must deny summary judgment. But here, the district
court weighed the evidence on summary judgment and decided that Harry’s Dairy had breached
the contract, and Mr. Good had not. The district court held a trial on damages, which of course
resulted in a judgment in favor of Mr. Good. This Court must reverse the decision of the district
court, because numerous issues of material fact prevent summary judgment. Harry’s Dairy is
entitled to its day in court to prove its own claims and defend against Mr. Good’s, and is asking
this Court to reverse the summary judgment decision of the district court, and remand for a trial
on the merits.
B.

Statement of Facts
Appellant Harry’s Dairy is a dairy located in Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 181. Harry’s Dairy is

owned and operated by retired attorney Harry DeHaan. R. Vol. II, p. 578. Mr. DeHaan acquired
his first dairy over fifteen years ago. R. Vol. I, p. 180. In October 2015, Harry’s Dairy was
operating two facilities—one in Wendell and another in Buhl. R. Vol. I, p. 181.
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Trent and Jennifer Cummins are the owners of a hay dealer called “Hay Now, LLC.” R.
Vol. I, p. 183. Ms. Cummins is Mr. DeHaan’s daughter. R. Vol. I, p. 180. Hay Now would find
hay and negotiate prices on behalf of Harry’s Dairy. Id. Despite Hay Now’s recent formation (in
2014), Ms. Cummins has an extensive background in hay and dairies. R. Vol. I, p. 355, L. 13-14.
She has many years of experience in feeding hay to dairy cattle, buying hay for dairy cattle, and
in understanding the general hay quality needs and issues associated with dairy cattle. R. Vol. I,
p. 410.
Jeff Good is, since 2012, a hay farmer and supplier in Murphy, Idaho. R. Vol. I, pp. 35354, L. 1-2. Mr. Good is married to Vivian Good. R. Vol. I, p. 360, L. 63.
The relevant facts concerning this case occurred over a short period of time, between
October 2015 and April 2016. In October 2015, in talking with Russell Dygert, a truck driver,
Mr. Good learned that Hay Now was interested in purchasing hay. R. Vol. I, p. 354, L. 4-5. Mr.
Dygert owns AgWorx, LLC, a trucking company that Ms. Cummins had used before to haul hay.
R. Vol. I, pp. 410-11. Ms. Cummins was interested in buying Mr. Good’s hay crop because its
proximity to the Harry’s Dairy facilities would save money on freight. Id. Harry’s Dairy had
previously been purchasing hay from Eastern Idaho, which was more expensive to ship to its
facilities. R. Vol. I, p. 170.
Also in October 2015, Trent and Jennifer Cummins traveled to Mr. Good’s farm to take
samples of the hay harvested in 2015. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3. Mr. Good had a sampling probe
available for Ms. Cummins to use to take samples of the hay. R. Vol. I, p. 171. But, Ms.
Cummins was “only able to obtain samples from bales on the outsides of the stacks as the inside
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bales were not accessible to me.” R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3. Ms. Cummins sent the samples to
Dairyland Laboratories for a report on the nutritional content. R. Vol. I, p. 412. The tests showed
that the “hay was fairly evenly split between what the dairy industry considers premium hay and
what it considers feeder hay.” Id. At this time, no testing for mold was performed, as it was not
standard in the industry to do so. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3.
After receiving the lab results, Mr. Cummins contacted Mr. Good to discuss purchasing
the hay, and informed him it was for dairy cattle consumption. Id. At that time, Mr. Good
demanded that he would only sell the 2015 crop if they would also take the 2014 crop, for a total
of 3,000 tons of hay. Id., L. 4. Due to the sensitivities of dairy cattle, Mr. Cummins expressed to
Mr. Good his concerns about possible weather damage and mold in the older 2014 crop, and Mr.
Good represented that there had been minimal weather in the past few years and thus the hay had
not been exposed to weather that would result in damage or molding. Id., L. 5, p. 719, L. 5. 1
Based on Mr. Good’s representation that the hay was not moldy, Ms. Cummins further
sampled the 2014 hay crop, but only to determine the nutritional value, not mold content. R. Vol.
II, p. 714, L. 3. While Mr. Good did not block testing of the hay, it was impossible to fully test it,
as “we couldn’t go cut the bales and find the mold.” R. Vol. I, p. 187. And, the hay was stacked
four bales high, four bales wide, and thirty to fifty bales long, preventing Ms. Cummins from
obtaining samples from the inside of the stacks—only bales on the outside of the stacks were
1

Mr. Good disputes that he made this representation. R. Vol. I, p. 163. But, despite his
denials, Mr. Good would later admit that there was rain in October 2015, and that he had stacked
the hay two bales high, instead of four, due to the weather that month. Id., p. 164. Mr. Good also
later informed Mr. DeHaan that he baled his hay wet. Id., p. 188.
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tested. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3-4. She sent the second set of hay samples to Dairyland for
nutritional testing. Id., L. 4. Ms. Cummins testified that she never tested for mold because the
industry practice was that farmers would keep any hay containing mold. Id., L. 3. Harry’s
Dairy’s nutritionist also stated that only when mold is visible will further testing be performed to
identify the amount and type of mold and toxins present. R. Vol. I, p. 260.
Based on the nutritional testing, Hay Now negotiated a selling price of $128.00 per ton
for the 3,000 tons of hay on the farm—both the 2014 and 2015 crops. R. Vol. I, p. 31. Harry’s
Dairy was responsible for paying the freight. Id. On December 11, 2015, Harry DeHaan sent a
letter to Mr. Good memorializing the general terms of the agreement as follows:
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Id. Mr. Good did not respond to the letter, but cashed the enclosed $25,000.00 check. R. Vol. I,
p. 69, L. 9-10.
In December 2015, Harry’s Dairy began taking deliveries of hay from Mr. Good. R. Vol.
II, p. 531, L. 6. Shortly after receiving the shipments from Mr. Good, employees at both dairies
began finding mold in the hay. Id. Harry’s Dairy employee Francisco Aguirre noticed that the
cattle were sick and began to exhibit decreased milk production. R. Vol. I, p. 256. Harry’s
Dairy’s employees attempted to sort through the hay to determine what was usable. Id., pp. 25657. Harry’s Dairy’s veterinarian also viewed a moldy load of hay on the property on December
24, 2015, and strongly recommended it not be fed to the cattle and instead returned to the
grower. Id., p. 430.
On December 29, 2015, Harry’s Dairy returned a load of hay to Mr. Good that was
saturated with mold. R. Vol. I, p. 189. Harry’s Dairy continued to take delivery of hay and
continued to find mold. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 8-9, p. 717. This was frustrating for Harry’s Dairy,
as it was paying for the freight to haul the hay to the dairy, only to find that the bales were
tainted when delivered and opened. See R. Vol. I, p. 522.
Ms. Cummins then went to the Good farm to oversee what was loaded onto the truck to
minimize moldy hay being shipped to the dairy. R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 7. Ms. Cummins watched
as Mr. Good’s employee was loading hay and saw visual molding throughout the stack. Id. Ms.
Cummins discussed with Mr. Good that there was a systemic mold problem and it was dangerous
for the dairy cattle. Id. When Ms. Cummins objected to this hay, Mr. Good informed her that his
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practice was to load 50/50 good and bad bales, and Ms. Cummins stated that the moldy hay
would only end up being returned. Id. 2
Throughout the winter of 2016, Harry’s Dairy continued to try to work with Mr. Good
but continued to encounter mold in some of the loads. R. Vol. I, p. 189. Between December 17,
2015 and January 27, 2016, Harry’s Dairy hauled 22 shipments of hay totaling 726 and a half
tons of hay. Id., p. 188. Harry’s Dairy paid Mr. Good $112,978.49 of the total contract price. R.
Vol. I, p. 361, L. 72. While there was a time during which Harry’s Dairy was not hauling, it
continued to take delivery of some hay until March 2016 despite continuing to encounter mold.
R. Vol. II, p. 715, L. 9.
Harry’s Dairy rejected another load of hay on March 4, 2016, but did not return the load
as Mr. Good was not willing to pay the return freight, so the load remained at the Wendell dairy.
R. Vol. I, p. 189. That moldy hay was set aside in a stack and tested later, in July 2016, for mold.
R. Vol. I, p. 257. The tests showed high concentrations of Cladosporium and yeast. Id., pp. 25965. Mr. Jess Argyle, dairy consultant, explained that:

2

Mr. Good admits remembering that Ms. Cummins did mention a mold problem at least
once, although he contends that Ms. Cummins was speaking of oats not hay. R. Vol. I, p. 22,
Deposition of Jeff Good, p. 165, ll. 16-21.
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I received a phone call from Fransisco Aguirre (Dairy Manager) about a load of hay that was received
from Jeff Good. I looked over the hay with Fransisco anc:t my lnltfal recommendation was that he not
feed It 10 the milk cows because of the amount of mold that was visible on the hay. It was then decided
to ~rt out the vislbly moldy bales and set them aside even though most of the bales had some mold.
The problem with mold is that is does not show up on a normal forage analysis. It is only when we see
visible mold that WE\ will then run further analysis to Identify the amount and type of mold and toxins
present.
Fransisco had also started to have some health Issues showing up In the cattle that are related to mold
in the feed, very loose manure, aittle off feed, dry matter Intakes down, lower milk production and
hemorrhagic bowel syndrome. Mold present In the feed makes the fttd less palatable thus reducing
intakes which leads to mnk production loses. Another issue with mold is that it reduces t he digestibility
of the hay decreasing the energy content. Loses can be as high as 20% depending on the mold oontenl
In this case the hay was later tested for mold concentration and Identification. The analysis oonfirmed
the presence of mold, Oadosporlum, a dark blue-green to gray mold at a high concentration (1.9 million
cfu/gm). The analysis also tested for yeast concentrations which was at 800,000 cfu/gm. Yeast is
normally found in wet or ensiled feeds like corn silage. So finding a high level of yeast suggests that the
hay was put up with an excess amount of moisture.
The hay tbat was received was not dairy quality and my recommendation is not to feed It to dairy cows.

Id., p. 260.
Due to the systemic mold problem and the difficulties in sorting the hay, during February
2016, Harry’s Dairy had to cover by purchasing hay from other growers at higher prices. R. Vol.
I, p. 414. Harry’s Dairy spent on average $131.00 for this cover hay. Id., p. 497, L. 5.
From January through March 2016, the Goods repeatedly demanded that Harry’s Dairy
haul hay (and pay for hay) faster, despite no requirement to haul hay with any particular
frequency. R. Vol. II, pp. 715-16, L. 10. The Goods’ bank was apparently pressuring them (R.
Vol. II, p. 793) and the Goods in turn pressured Harry’s Dairy to purchase and haul hay faster. R.
Vol. II, pp. 715-16, L. 10. A lengthy string of text messages between Ms. Cummins and Ms.
Vivian Good reveals the Goods’ desire for Harry’s Dairy to haul and pay as fast as possible. R. at
Vol. I, pp. 229-48. These text messages do not mention the mold problem, but Ms. Cummins
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explained that she did not want to rock the boat with Ms. Good and interfere with the parties’
business relationship. R. Vol. I, p. 176. And, while the December 2015 letter mentioned prepaying in thirds, ultimately the parties’ course of dealing was that Harry’s Dairy paid for the hay
as it was hauled. E.g., R. Vol. I, p. 191. Harry’s Dairy was paid up for all loads that were hauled
when it was sued in May 2016, although the parties disputed whether Harry’s Dairy owed about
$8,627.84 for two loads that Harry’s Dairy believes were never delivered. R. Vol. I, pp. 24-25, L.
14, Vol. II, p. 540.
On April 21, 2016, counsel for Mr. Good wrote a letter to Mr. DeHaan, demanding that
Harry’s Dairy “make arrangements by April 27, 2016 to commence shipping the remaining hay
from Jeff’s farm to your dairy.” R. Vol. I, p. 337. On April 25, Mr. DeHaan responded by email,
stating that he would buy all conforming hay, but would not buy moldy hay. Id., p. 525. He
explained “[t]he bales were packed together in a way that would not allow inspection or testing
of any but the outside of the stack. When we hauled almost a third of the hay, we got into mold
problems. We sent some back, we mixed some with better hay, and generally tried to
accommodate.” Id. On April 28, 2016, Mr. DeHaan responded via a formal letter, explaining that
he viewed moldy stacks of hay on Mr. Good’s property, but offering to purchase all non-moldy
hay, potentially using a third party to sort the hay before loading. Id., pp. 522-24. Inexplicably,
and despite contending that his hay was free from mold, Mr. Good refused Harry’s Dairy’s offer
to purchase all non-moldy hay and to inspect each load before it was placed in the truck. R. Vol.
II, p. 694. Harry’s Dairy did not hear anything further from Mr. Good until he sued Harry’s
Dairy in May 2016. Id., p. 22. Mr. Good sold the 2,000 remaining tons to Bob Barnes Trucking
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and Felix Anchustegui for substantially less than the Harry’s Dairy contract price. Tr. Vol. I, p.
62 (transcript p. 110, L 8-20). Bob Barnes, who also acted as Mr. Good’s expert at trial, admitted
that some of Mr. Good’s hay was moldy. R. Vol. II, p. 799.
C.

Procedural History
Less than a month after Harry’s Dairy late April response, on May 16, 2016, Mr. Good

filed suit in Owyhee County. R. Vol. I, p. 22. In his complaint, Mr. Good stated that Harry’s
Dairy entered into a contract with Mr. Good in which it agreed to purchase 3,000 tons of hay at
$128 per ton plus costs of transporting hay to Harry’s Dairy. Id., p. 24. Mr. Good claimed that
Harry’s Dairy failed to pay him for $12,323.91 of hay already hauled but not paid for. Id. 3 Mr.
Good also claimed that Harry’s Dairy had failed to take delivery and pay for approximately
another 2,000 tons of hay that remained on Mr. Good’s property. Id., p. 26. Based on these facts,
Mr. Good alleged causes of action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and specific
performance. Id., pp. 26-27. Mr. Good claimed damages of $268,323.91. Id., p. 27. At the time
of the complaint’s filing, Mr. Good had not resold the hay that remained on his property. Id.
Harry’s Dairy answered the complaint (p. 34) and denied Mr. Good’s causes of action.
Id., pp. 35-36. Harry’s Dairy then counterclaimed for fraud, violation of express and implied
warranties, and breach of contract. Id., pp. 36-38. These causes of action were based on Mr.
Good’s representations that the hay was mold free, that Mr. Good knew that Harry’s Dairy was
3

Mr. Good would later acknowledge that the amount demanded did not reflect the credit
for the December 2015 returned load, and the amount due for the loads delivered should be
$8,627.84. R. Vol. II, p. 559. Harry’s Dairy maintains that these loads were never delivered. R.
Vol. II, p. 540.
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not testing for mold, and that the mold would not be discovered until the bales were hauled. Id.
Harry’s Dairy alleged that the mold caused damage to its herd and milk production. Id. Harry’s
Dairy also was damaged by having to purchase cover hay on the open market. Id. Mr. Good filed
an Answer to Counterclaim on July 19, 2016. Id., p. 58.
After the parties engaged in discovery, Mr. Good moved for summary judgment on
February 24, 2017. Id., p. 127, et seq.. Mr. Good moved to dismiss Harry’s Dairy’s counterclaim
for violation of implied and express warranties. Id., p. 138, et. seq. Mr. Good claimed he did not
make any representations that the hay was mold-free and gave Harry’s Dairy access to the hay
for inspection. Id.. Mr. Good also moved for summary judgment on the dueling claims for breach
of contract, arguing that Harry’s Dairy was in breach for failing to haul and pre-pay for hay. Id.
On summary judgment, the district court decided that there were issues of fact related to
Harry’s Dairy’s warranty claims and each parties’ breach of contract claim that had to be decided
by a jury, but it did dismiss Harry’s Dairy’s express warranty claim. R. Vol. II, p. 576. Mr. Good
moved for reconsideration. R. Vol. II, p. 674 et seq. Harry’s Dairy also moved for
reconsideration. Id., p. 700. On reconsideration, the district court dismissed Harry’s Dairy’s
counterclaims and entered judgment on liability for Mr. Good’s claims. Id., p. 837. Harry’s Dairy
moved again for reconsideration, and this motion was denied. Id., p. 967 et seq.
The case went to trial before a jury in May 2018. R. Vol. III, p. 1059. The jury was
informed that liability was already determined, and its job was to decide the issue of damages.
Id., p. 1071. The jury found that Mr. Good was entitled to damages in the amount of
$144,000.00. Id., p. 1091.
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On June 1, 2018, Mr. Good’s counsel moved for an award of attorney fees and costs. Id.,
p. 1092 et seq. Mr. Good also moved for an award of prejudgment interest. Id., p. 1111 et seq.
The district court awarded fees and costs (id. p. 1155-57) and prejudgment interest (id. p. 1151).
An amended judgment was entered on June 29, 2018. Id., p. 1161-62.
Harry’s Dairy moved for a new trial or, alternatively, to alter or amend the judgment. Id.,
p. 1115. The order denying new trial was entered on August 3, 2018. Id., p. 1184. The district
court amended the judgment to reduce it by $3,686.40 to give Harry’s Dairy credit for the
returned moldy load of December 2015. Id., p. 1192. An amended judgment as entered on
August 8, 2018. Id., p. 1194. Harry’s Dairy timely appealed on September 13, 2018. Id., p. 1197.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.
Did the district court err in dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s cause of action for breach
of contract on summary judgment?
2.
Did the district court err in determining that Harry’s Dairy was liable to Mr. Good
for breach of contract on summary judgment?
3.
Did the district court err in dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s cause of action for breach
of express warranty on summary judgment?
4.
Did the district court err in dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s cause of action for breach
of implied warranty on summary judgment?
5.
Did the district court err in deciding that Mr. Good had provided reasonable
notice of sale to Harry’s Dairy before reselling goods at private sales?
6.
evidence?

Was the jury verdict awarding damages supported by substantial and competent

7.

Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees and costs?

8.

Did the district court err in awarding prejudgment interest?

9.

Is Harry’s Dairy entitled to an award of fees and costs on appeal?
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III.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment:
When reviewing the district court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court

applies the same standard used by the district court. Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,
556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Regan v. Owen, 163 Idaho 359, 362, 413 P.3d 759, 762 (2018). “If there is no genuine issue of
material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.”
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009)
(quoting Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746
(2007)).
B.

Jury’s Award:
The jury’s verdict on factual issues will generally not be disturbed on appeal. Boel v.

Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 12, 43 P.3d 768, 771 (2002). “When reviewing a jury
verdict on appeal the evidence adduced at trial is construed in a light most favorable to the party
who prevailed at trial.” Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 722,
726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). But, when it appears to this Court that the verdict is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence or is against the clear weight of the evidence,
then those issues become questions of law upon which this Court may review freely. Boel, 137
Idaho at 12, 43 P.3d at 771.
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s Breach Of Contract Claim
On Summary Judgment, and in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. Good’s
Breach of Contract Claim.
On summary judgment, Harry’s Dairy alleged that it rightfully refused to take delivery of

the remaining 2,000 tons of hay due to the mold issue. R. Vol. II, p. 587. Harry’s Dairy had to
cover, resulting in damages because it had to buy hay on the open market for a higher rate. Id.
Mr. Good argued that Harry’s Dairy breached the contract for failure to pay for and haul the hay.
R. Vol. I, pp. 150-52. The district court, after reconsideration, and despite originally finding
issues of fact, granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Good, dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s
breach of contract action. R. Vol. II, pp. 845-47. This was in error, because there were numerous
issues of fact preventing summary judgment on this claim—the district court was correct when it
initially denied summary judgment. Id., p. 587.
1.

There is an issue of fact regarding whether this contract is an installment
contract, and the rules that apply to installment contracts are different.

The district court’s error begins with the failure to recognize that the Good-Harry’s Dairy
contract was an installment contract, which is governed by unique rules under the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”). Admittedly, this was not made clear to the district court—but, both
counsels did argue this was an installment contract. Tr. Vol. I, p. 39 (transcript p. 19, L. 7), p. 44
(transcript p. 40, L. 3). 4

4

Harry’s Dairy also requested a jury instruction related to breach of installment contracts.
R. Vol. II, p. 689; see also id. pp. 696, 894.
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Under the UCC, “[a]n ‘installment contract’ is one which requires or authorizes the
delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a
clause ‘each delivery is a separate contract’ or its equivalent.” I.C. § 28-2-612(1). This section
“applies wherever a contract for multiple items authorizes the delivery of the items in separate
groups at different times.” Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 965 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Midwest Mobile Diagnostic
Imaging v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998). Whether a contract is an
installment contract is a question of fact. Arkla Energy Res., a Div. of Arkla, Inc. v. Roye Realty
& Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 860 (10th Cir. 1993).
Here, the contract provided for the hauling of multiple loads of hay in separate lots
whenever Harry’s Dairy decided to do so. R. Vol. I, p. 31. At the same time, Harry’s Dairy was
purchasing the 2014 and 2015 hay harvests in bulk. Id. So, there was an important threshold
issue of fact to be determined before the district court could apply the UCC. The failure to
address this keystone issue led to a confused analysis on summary judgment. This error alone
indicates that a reversal of the summary judgment order is appropriate.
2.

If installment contract rules apply, there are issues of fact regarding whether
prior moldy installments “substantially impaired the contract.”

Application of the UCC installment contract provisions brings clarity to the question of
whether either party could terminate the contract related to the remaining 2,000 tons of hay based
on the prior performance of the opposing party. Section 28-2-612 explains when an installment
contract is breached:
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(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if
the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and
cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required
documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and
the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that
installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a
breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he
accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of
cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past installments
or demands performance as to future installments.
I.C. § 28-2-612.
“Under § 2-612(3) the right to cancel does not arise unless the nonconforming
[installments] substantially impair the value of the entire contract.” Midwest Mobile, 965 F.
Supp. at 1015 (emphasis in original). The purpose of this “substantial impairment” requirement
is “to preclude a party from canceling a contract for trivial defects.” Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc.
v. Multi-State Legal Studies, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). “Whether a breach
constitutes ‘substantial impairment’ of the entire contract is a question of fact.” Midwest Mobile,
965 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing Bill’s Coal Co. v. Board of Public Utilities, 887 F.2d 242, 247 (10th
Cir.1989)). Official comment six to Section 28-2-612 explains the substantial impairment
doctrine further:
Whether the non-conformity in any given installment justifies cancellation as to
the future depends, not on whether such nonconformity indicates an intent or
likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but whether the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the whole contract. If only the
seller’s security in regard to future installments is impaired, he has the right to
demand adequate assurances of proper future performance but has not an
immediate right to cancel the entire contract. It is clear under this Article,
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however, that defects in prior installments are cumulative in effect, so that
acceptance does not wash out the defect “waived.”
I.C. § 28-2-612, cmt. 6. “The most useful test of substantial value is to determine whether
material inconvenience or injustice will result if the aggrieved party is forced to wait and receive
an ultimate tender minus the part or aspect repudiated.” I.C. § 28-2-610, cmt. 3. 5
Even if the contract is not substantially impaired, an aggrieved party has the right to
demand adequate assurances of future performance under I.C. § 28-2-609. 6 If the requested party
fails to provide adequate assurances to a “justified demand” within 30 days, the party repudiates
the contract. Id., § 28-2-609(4). Whether a demand for adequate assurances is “justified,” is a
question of fact. See Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1148
(3d Cir. 1991).
Harry’s Dairy provided ample evidence on summary judgment that mold existed in many
of the installments and that non-conformity substantially impaired the value of the contract. Mr.
DeHaan explained that: “it’s clear, mold is poisonous to dairy cattle. We asked him about it.
There is no question, you can’t sell milk cow hay with mold in it. It’s poison.” R. Vol. I, p. 187.
5

Section 28-2-612 uses the term “non-conformity or default.” Whether an installment of
goods is nonconforming is a broader analysis than whether they conform to a warranty: “Goods
or conduct including any part of a performance are ‘conforming’ or conform to the contract
when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.” I.C. § 28-2-106(2).
Nonconformity “includes not only breaches of warranties but also any failure of the seller to
perform according to his obligations under the contract.” I.C. § 28-2–714, cmt. 2. The UCC
allows extrinsic evidence of the terms of the agreement including “course of performance, course
of dealing, or usage of trade.” Id. § 28-2-202(a).
6

A demand for performance as to future installments also reinstates an installment
contract that has been substantially impaired. Id. § 28-2-612(3).
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Harry’s Dairy’s veterinarian also viewed a moldy stack of hay on December 24, 2015, during his
routine visit to the dairy. R. Vol. I, p. 430. He “recommended that this hay be immediately
refused and returned to the grower.” Id. Sorting moldy from non-moldy bales is “difficult at best,
because even though the outside of the bale may appear acceptable, once the bale is opened, the
inside of the bale may be badly damaged.” Id. “Feeding moldy hay is very detrimental to cow
health” and may ultimately result in death and disease. Id. “Therefore, feeding of moldy feed of
any kind is to be avoided.” Id. 7
In addition, Harry’s Dairy explained that continuing to handle moldy installments was
practically impossible and materially inconvenient. Ms. Cummins noted that, due to the practical
difficulties in determining the quality of large amounts of hay “its industry custom to work
together and reject the bad, or moldy, bales that were not visually available upon testing. Thus,
the bad bales are left to the farmer and the marketable bales are sent on to the dairyman. I
assumed this industry custom and practice would also govern the Good hay.” R. Vol. I, p. 413.
“This is the first situation I’ve encountered wherein a farmer demands moldy hay be delivered
regardless of custom or industry practices and regardless of the damages that inevitably will
result from feeding moldy hay.” R. Vol. I, p. 415. Mr. DeHaan also opined: “I have been in the
dairy business for over a decade and it is customary that hay containing mold is returned or taken

7

Despite Mr. Good’s role in supplying the dairy industry, he testified at this deposition
that he did not know what was fit for dairy cow consumption, and took no responsibility for the
quality of the hay. R. Vol. I, p. 164. He stated: “I don’t know anything about cows. You are the
expert.” Id. “Good has no idea what is considered hay fit for a dairy cow because he is not a
dairyman and he does not know anything about cows.” Id., p. 355.
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back by the seller, while non-contaminated hay continues to be purchased.” Id., p. 498. Indeed,
the whole point of purchasing from Mr. Good, whose farm was located closer to the Harry’s
Dairy facilities, was to save money on freight. R. Vol. I, p. 410-11. If bales had to be delivered,
broken open, assessed one by one, and then returned to Mr. Good, the whole point of the contract
would be defeated from Harry’s Dairy’s perspective. Harry’s Dairy offered to buy all non-moldy
hay, using a third party to sort hay before it was loaded, but Mr. Good rejected this offer. Id., pp.
522-24. An important factual question was therefore whether the non-conforming installments
“substantially impaired” the contract from Harry’s Dairy’s point of view, allowing it to terminate
the contract as to the remaining 2,000 tons of hay. This is particularly true in a circumstance in
which Mr. Good and his counsel were demanding that all hay be delivered, to include known
nonconforming and moldy hay.
Further, on summary judgment, the district court focused on Harry’s Dairy’s failure to
give notice regarding the rejection of the remaining 2,000 tons of hay. R. Vol. II, pp. 843-44.
However, Section 2-612, comment 7, gives the aggrieved party time to consider whether or not
to cancel the entire contract based on nonconforming installments, and ultimately, the aggrieved
party must give notice of cancellation within a reasonable time: “A reasonable time for notifying
of cancellation, judged by commercial standards under the section on good faith, extends of
course to include the time covered by any reasonable negotiation in good faith.” I.C. § 28-2-612,
cmt. 7. The lower court improperly took this issue away from the jury.
In April 2016, Mr. DeHaan indicated to Mrs. Good that he was considering cancelling the
contract due to the mold issues, prompting Mr. Good’s counsel to draft the demand letter. R.
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Vol. I, p. 336. Before unequivocally canceling, however, Harry’s Dairy opted to request
adequate assurances that only conforming hay would be provided in the future. R. Vol. I, pp.
522-24. However, Mr. Good failed to respond to that letter, and simply filed suit less than 30
days later in May 2016. R. Vol. I, p. 22. If Harry’s Dairy’s demand for adequate assurances was
“justified,” Mr. Good’s failure to provide adequate assurances in 30 days was a repudiation of
the contract, entitling Harry’s Dairy to damages. I.C. § 28-2-609(4). As a result of the
repudiation, Harry’s Dairy was forced to buy replacement hay at a higher cost than the contract
price. Harry’s Dairy is entitled to damages for the amount paid for hay over and above the
contract price. I.C. § 28-2-713.
This Court must reverse and remand, to allow for a trial on whether the prior moldy
installments substantially impaired the contract entitling Harry’s Dairy to cancel the 2,000
remaining tons, whether Harry’s Dairy made a justified demand for adequate assurances,
whether Mr. Good repudiated by failing to respond to Harry’s Dairy’s request for adequate
assurances within 30 days, and whether Harry’s Dairy is entitled to damages for the cover hay.
3.

If general UCC rules apply to Harry’s Dairy’s cause of action for breach of
contract, issues of fact still prevent summary judgment.

Even if the non-installment contract rules of the UCC apply to the remaining 2,000 tons
of hay, there are issues of fact that prohibit summary judgment, and the district court erred in
dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s cause of action for breach of contract.
Under I.C. § 28-2-601, the buyer may accept or reject goods in part or in whole. Id.; G &
H Land & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman & Nelson, Inc., 102 Idaho 204, 209, 628 P.2d 1038, 1043
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(1981). I.C. § 28-2-602(1) provides: “rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after
their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.” Id. “The
question of what is a reasonable time for the rejection of nonconforming goods by a buyer
depends upon ‘the nature, purposes and circumstances’ of the transaction.” G & H Land & Cattle
Co., at id. If a buyer rightfully rejects, the buyer has “no further obligations with regard to goods
rightfully rejected.” I.C. § 28-2-602(2)(c).
But, the buyer’s duty to reject is not triggered until he or she has “reasonable opportunity
to inspect the goods . . . .” I.C. § 28-2-606. A buyer’s right to inspect the goods post-purchase is
defined in I.C. § 28-2-513(1): where goods “are identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a
right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in any
reasonable manner.” Id.; As Comment 9 states:
Inspection under this section has to do with the buyer’s check-up
on whether the seller’s performance is in accordance with a
contract previously made and is not to be confused with the
“examination” of the goods or of a sample or model of them at the
time of contracting which may affect the warranties involved in the
contract.
Id., cmt. 9.
Under this UCC framework, there are genuine issues of fact that preclude summary
judgment. Before the obligation to reject arises, the buyer must be afforded the opportunity to
inspect “in any reasonable manner.” Harry’s Dairy had a right to inspect the remaining,
undelivered hay in April 2016 in such a manner as to identify conforming and nonconforming
bales, yet was prevented from doing so. R. Vol. II, pp. 723-24, L. 9-10. Mr. DeHaan went to the
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Good farm with an empty hay hauler and a blank check in April of 2016, but was never
permitted to inspect the hay in such a manner that all moldy versus non-moldy bales could be
properly sorted. Id.
But, whether or not Harry’s Dairy had an opportunity to inspect, Harry’s Dairy made a
proper rejection of any non-conforming hay in the remaining 2,000 tons within a reasonable
time. First, Harry’s Dairy April 28 letter constituted a formal, written rejection of
nonconforming, moldy hay in the remaining 2,000 tons. The letter stated in relevant part: “The
dairy will accept the non-moldy hay” and “We will accept merchantable, fit for the purpose hay.
We will not accept hay that will poison our cattle.” R. Vol. I, pp. 522-24. That letter was a
sufficient rejection of nonconforming goods in the remaining 2,000 tons. Figueroa v. Kit-San
Co., 123 Idaho 149, 158, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct. App. 1992) (Buyer’s formal letter denying
liability, claiming that seller had misrepresented its product, supplied unsuitable bentonite, and
that seller must make the bentonite conform to the oral contract or remove it was notice of
rejection). Whether the rejection was timely may be a factual question. Figueroa at id. (rejection
200 days after first delivery of bentonite was timely rejection under the circumstances).
Second, Mr. Good had been on notice of a mold problem for several months. In addition
to returning the December 2015 moldy load, and informing Mr. Good of the March 2016 moldy
load, Ms. Cummins told Mr. Good that “moldy hay would only end up being returned.” R. Vol.
II, p. 17, L. 7. A reasonable jury could easily find that Ms. Cummins’ statement to Mr. Good
about moldy hay being returned was a timely rejection of future non-conforming deliveries. The
district court is not permitted to weigh evidence on summary judgment.
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Lastly, Harry’s Dairy made a justified demand for adequate assurances under I.C. § 28-2609, and when Mr. Good failed to respond, preferring to litigate, he repudiated the contract. This
section applies whether the contract is or is not an installment contract. See Section A.2, supra.
In sum, Harry’s Dairy offered the district court at least four times in which it potentially
rejected the non-conforming hay. Whether these notifications constituted rejections and whether
they were timely remain issues of fact. The district court therefore erred in granting summary
judgment in this regard.
4.

The District court erred in granting summary judgment on the liability
portion of Mr. Good’s breach of contract claim.

The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Good on the
breach of contract claim, because there are issues of fact related to the alleged breaches that
prevent summary judgment. Mr. Good argued on summary judgment that Harry’s Dairy
breached the contract in two ways: by failing to haul hay at the frequency that Mr. Good desired,
and failing to make payment for the remaining 2,000 tons of hay. R. Vol. I, p. 151. Harry’s Dairy
opposed the motion, arguing that Harry’s Dairy did not breach the contract for failing to haul for
and pay for the remaining 2,000 tons—rather it was exercising its rights to reject nonconforming goods under I.C. § 28-2-601. R. Vol. II, p. 538. On reply, Mr. Good reiterated that
Harry’s Dairy was in material breach for failure to haul hay between late January and early
March 2016, and failure to pre-pay for hay. Id., p. 556. In its initial summary judgment decision,
the district court held that there were issues of fact related to which party breached the contract—
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particularly where all facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, Harry’s Dairy.
Id., p. 587.
Mr. Good moved for reconsideration of this ruling, arguing again that Harry’s Dairy was
in breach for failure to haul and pay for the remaining 2,000 tons of hay. Id., pp. 679-80. Harry’s
Dairy opposed this motion, arguing again that it rightfully rejected the remaining 2,000 tons. Id.,
pp. 695-97. On reconsideration, the district court evaluated the evidence, and decided that
Harry’s Dairy had breached the contract, finding that Harry’s Dairy had failed to pay for and
haul the remaining 2,000 tons of hay, and that moldy loads had not been properly rejected. Id.,
pp. 845-46.
Harry’s Dairy requested reconsideration of that ruling. Id., p. 887. Harry’s Dairy argued
that there was no deadline in the contract for hauling hay. Id., p. 896. “Nowhere as Good pointed
to a delivery deadline that the Dairy violated.” Id. Harry’s Dairy also argued that the parties’
course of performance altered the requirement that Harry’s Dairy prepay or pay in thirds. Id., p.
897. In its second reconsideration decision, the district court improperly weighed the evidence
and found, although there were “accommodations” regarding payment terms, Harry’s Dairy was
in breach for failure to pay in thirds up front. Id., p. 971. The district court did not address
Harry’s Dairy’s argument that the contract contained no deadline to haul. Id., pp. 970-71.
(a)

The District Court erred in holding that Harry’s Dairy had breached
for failure to haul hay.

The district court erred in granting summary judgment by holding that Harry’s Dairy
breached the contract by failing to haul. The December 11, 2015 letter from Harry’s Dairy to Mr.
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Good memorializing the general terms of the agreement does not contain a time for performance,
but states “[w]e agreed that the hay we haul at any given time will be our decision.” R. Vol. I, p.
31. Without a specified time frame for performance, the UCC provides a gap filler: “The time for
shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this chapter or agreed
upon shall be a reasonable time.” I.C. § 28-2-309(1). Further, I.C. § 28-1-204(2) “states the basic
principle for interpreting what constitutes ‘reasonable time’ as follows: ‘What is a reasonable
time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action.’”
Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 181, 595 P.2d 709, 715 (1979).
Importantly, the issue of “reasonable time” is one of fact. Id.
The parties’ agreement was that the time for hauling was left to Harry’s Dairy’s complete
discretion. R. Vol. I, p. 31. But, even if a reasonability standard is applied, Mr. Good did not
provide any evidence on summary judgment as to the reasonable time for Harry’s Dairy to haul,
and did not show that it had breached that timeline. See R. Vol. I, pp. 127-575. Harry’s Dairy
had already hauled and paid for the substantial sum of $112,978.49 for the hay. R. Vol. I, p. 361,
L. 72. There was a brief time between late January and early March 2016 when Harry’s Dairy
was not hauling before hauling resumed again, but whether this was a violation of a reasonable
shipping time is a question of fact. Therefore, the district court erred in deciding that Harry’s
Dairy had breached for failure to haul hay.
Even if the failure to haul could be found to be a breach, the trier of fact would have to
additionally decide that the failure to haul in a reasonable time was a substantial impairment to
the contract, and thus a breach of the whole, whether Mr. Good reinstated the contract by
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demanding performance as to future installments, and whether Harry’s Dairy provided adequate
assurances in response to Mr. Good’s demand. I.C. § 28-2-612(3). The installment contract
provisions of the UCC also apply to sellers. E.g., Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral
Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1148 (3d Cir. 1991). Proving a substantial impairment to the contract due
to the alleged failure to haul is an important prerequisite to Mr. Good obtaining a finding on
liability and ultimately an award of damages.
(b)

The District Court erred in holding that Harry’s Dairy breached the
contract for failure to pay for loads it had received and those it had
yet to haul.

Similarly, there are issues of fact regarding whether Harry’s Dairy breached the contract
for failure to pay, and whether Mr. Good reinstated the contract by demanding future
performance. I.C. § 28-2-612(3).
Mr. Good alleged that Harry’s Dairy was behind on its payments by $8,627.84, and
Harry’s Dairy disputed that it had failed to pay for loads. See R. at 540. That is not a substantial
impairment of the contract, particularly when Harry’s Dairy had already paid $112,978.49. R.
Vol. I., p. 361, L. 72. See, e.g., National Farmers Organization v. Coast Trading Co., Inc., 488
F.Supp. 944, 949 (D.C. Or. 1977) (Absent a showing that buyer’s failure to pay substantially
impaired value of contract for sale of grain, seller was not relieved of its duty to deliver the
grain.); Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1147-48 (3d Cir.
1991) (Buyer’s failure to pay in thirty days of installment was not substantial impairment of
contract.). Similarly, Harry’s Dairy’s alleged failure to pre-pay in thirds is not a substantial
impairment of the contract, where Harry’s Dairy was continuing to pay Mr. Good for the hay
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hauled. And, there was an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Good acquiesced in Harry’s Dairy
paying for the hay as it hauled it, and whether this operated as a waiver. R. Vol. II, p. 897; I.C.
§ 28-2-209; Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc., 944 F.2d at 1147-48.
Further, whether or not the alleged failure to pay substantially impaired the contract, Mr.
Good reinstated the contract when he requested adequate assurances in late April 2016. I.C. § 282-612(3). 8 Mr. DeHaan promptly replied and stated he would buy all non-moldy hay. R. Vol. I,
p. 522. Thus the contract remained in full force and effect, and Mr. Good repudiated the contract
when he failed to provide conforming hay, opting to sue instead.
Whether Harry’s Dairy was behind in payment, whether the prepayment in thirds
requirement had been waived, whether payment issues were a substantial impairment amounting
to a breach of the whole, and whether Mr. Good had reinstated the contract by demanding future
performance, are all issues of fact for the jury to decide.
5.

The District court erred in deciding that Mr. Good had provided proper
notice of resale before selling the hay at private sales.

The trial court, by its grant of summary judgment, took from the jury the question of
whether Mr. Good provided adequate notice of sale before a private sale under I.C. § 28-2706(3) via his April 21, 2016 demand letter. R. Vol. II, pp. 846-47. However, there were issues
of fact related to whether some of the hay sales preceded the April 21st notice. R. Vol. II, pp.
574-75 (letter from counsel to district court providing cites to record of pre-April 21st sales). At
8

Whether or not Mr. Good was entitled to make a just demand for adequate assurances is
yet another issue of fact. See Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131,
1148 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the very least, there was a load on April 9, 2016 that was admittedly hay tied to the Harry’s
Dairy contract. Compare R. Vol. I, p. 442 with p. 465. Indeed, Mr. Good’s evidence at trial was
conflicting regarding whether the hay sold was Harry’s Dairy’s hay or not, as more thoroughly
explained below. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court found adequate notice based upon
Mr. Good’s written communication to Mr. DeHaan, that notice followed, rather that preceded,
several of the sales to Mr. Barnes. The district court therefore erred in deciding that Mr. Good
had provided proper notice of resale as to those preceding loads.
B.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s Breach Of Express
Warranty Claim On Summary Judgment, As Mr. Good Expressly Warranted That
The Hay Would Not Contain Mold.
Idaho Code § 28-2-313 (“Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description,

sample”) provides as follows:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
....
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a specific intention
to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty.
Id.
On summary judgment, Mr. Good moved to dismiss Harry’s Dairy claim for breach of
warranty on the grounds that there were no warranties applicable to the sale of the hay. R. Vol. I,
p. 145-50. But, Mr. Good did not support the contention that there were no express warranties
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with either legal authority or factual support. See R. Vol. I, pp. 127-575 (initial summary
judgment proceedings). With nothing to oppose, Harry’s Dairy did not provide argument in
support of an express warranty. R. Vol. I, pp. 528-42. However, Harry’s Dairy identified that
“Mr. Cummins expressed concerns about weather damage and mold in the 2014 crop, and
Plaintiff stated that there had been minimal weather in 2014 and thus the hay had not been
exposed to weather that would result in damage.” R. Vol. I, pp. 529-30. On reply, Mr. Good did
not dispute this evidence. Id., pp. 545-50. However, Mr. Good stated in a conclusory fashion,
with no support, that, despite Harry’s Dairy not bearing the burden on summary judgment,
“absent from Defendant’s Opposition were any facts or argument supporting the existence of an
expressed warranty as pled in the counterclaim. Therefore, Defendant’s claim that Good violated
an expressed warranty should be dismissed without need for further argument.” Id., p. 552.
In its first summary judgment ruling (id., p. 576 et seq.), the district court dismissed the
express warranty claim. Id., pp. 582-83. The basis for doing so was two part: 1) “The text of the
written letter contract dated December 11, 2015 written by Harry DeHaan and sent to Jeff Good
clearly does not contain any affirmation of fact or promise made by Good to Harry’s Dairy
relating to the lack of poisonous mold in the hay.” And, 2) “there is no evidence to demonstrate
that Good made any sort of oral affirmation of fact or promise relating to the lack of mold in the
hay. In its briefing in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Harry’s Dairy does not
argue the existence or breach of an express warranty.” Id.
Harry’s Dairy moved for reconsideration of this order, based on the factual assertions of
Trent and Jennifer Cummins. Id., p. 840. In his declaration, Mr. Cummins stated “We were
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concerned weather damage in the 2014 hay may have resulted in mold. When I expressed this
concern to Mr. Good he represented to me that there had been very little weather incidents in
Melba over the past years and that the hay had not been exposed to weather that would result in
damage or mold to the hay.” Id., p. 719. Ms. Cummins stated “My husband and I were concerned
that weather damage in the 2014 hay may have resulted in mold. Mr. Good represented to Trent
that there had been very little weather incidents in Melba over the past years and that the hay had
not been exposed to weather that would result in damage or mold to the hay.” Id., p. 714.
The district court, on reconsideration, ruled that:
A statement made in 2016 about the weather in 2014 does
not rise to the level of an affirmation or promise made by Good
about the quality of the hay. This Court does not believe it would
be reasonable of Harry’s Dairy to rely on Good’s recollection of
the weather two years prior to create party of the basis of the
bargain. The Court believes that the alleged representation by
Good did not constitute an express warranty.
As such, the Court’s conclusion is that Good’s
representation was nothing more than an opinion or commendation
his believe of the quality of the hay. There was no affirmation or
promise made by Good related to the quality of the hay, thus
Harry’s Dairy’s breach of an express warranty counterclaim fails
as a matter of law.
Id., pp. 840-41. In this regard, the district court weighed evidence and acted as trier of fact,
particularly when it stated it would not be “reasonable” for Harry’s Dairy to rely on the
statement.
The district court erred because this Court has ruled repeatedly that “[w]hether a
statement by the seller was an express warranty is a question of fact.” Keller v. Inland Metals All
Weather Conditioning, Inc., 139 Idaho 233, 237, 76 P.3d 977, 981 (2003) (emphasis added). “In
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order to create an express warranty, the seller need not use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or
‘guarantee,’ nor need the seller have a specific intention to make a warranty.” Id. at 236, 76 P.3d
980. “An express warranty is not created by a seller’s mere affirmation of the value of the goods
or statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods.” Id.
(citing Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668 P.2d 65 (1983)). “[A]n
affirmation of fact is assumed to become the basis of the bargain.” I.C. § 28-2-313, cmts. 6, 8.
Here, district court took the issue from the jury when it decided that Mr. Good’s
statement was not an express warranty. Further, the district court’s finding that the statement was
an opinion, not a fact, is simply erroneous. The issue Harry’s Dairy wanted addressed was
whether the hay was subject to any conditions that would lead to molding, not the value, Mr.
Good’s opinion, or a commendation. See Keller, 139 Idaho at 236–37, 76 P.3d at 980–81. Mr.
Good responded by making a factual statement that the hay had not been exposed to adverse
weather that would cause molding or damage. This is not a statement that the hay was
“excellent” or “the best around” or “very valuable.” See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 434. This was a
direct factual statement regarding the goods to be sold, and whether an express warranty was
created is a jury question. See, e.g., Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 607, 611,
862 P.2d 299, 303 (1993) (“[C]onversations in which Simplot employees specifically told
Tolmie Farms that Vapam, used as instructed, would control nematodes and improve the yield
and quality of the potato harvest. . . . clearly could be viewed by a jury as constituting an
affirmation of fact which relates to the goods.”); Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (Evidence was sufficient to support jury’s finding that feed producer
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breached an express warranty regarding hog feed where feed producer representatives stated that
quality corn would be used in the feed and that farmers’ sows were harmed by substandard corn
used in feed.).
Finally, the district court erred when it decided that the express warranty had to be in
writing in the original letter. The UCC specifically allows that “any affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller become ‘part of the basis of the bargain.’” I.C. § 28-2-313. And,
parol evidence is allowed in the context of a sale of goods. I.C. § 28-2-202. For all these
reasons, the district court erred in dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s claim for breach of express
warranty on summary judgment. 9
C.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Harry’s Dairy’s Cause Of Action For
Breach Of Implied Warranties On Summary Judgment.
The district court erred in dismissing Harry’s Dairy claim for breach of implied warranty,

because there were issues of fact preventing dismissal. In his opening brief on summary
judgment, Mr. Good argued that there were no warranties because they were not contained in the
December 2015 letter, and that Harry’s Dairy relied on Hay Now’s expertise and inspection of
the hay, so no warranties passed to Harry’s Dairy. R. Vol. I, pp. 145-50. Harry’s Dairy opposed
by arguing that Harry’s Dairy’s pre-purchase inspection did not test for mold, and the industry
standard for pre-purchase inspection does not include mold testing. R. Vol. II, pp. 536-38. In its
first summary judgment decision, the district court held that there was no warranty for a

9

Whether Harry’s Dairy gave timely notice of the breach of express warranty, entitling it
to damages, is also for the jury to decide. See R. Vol. II, pp. 585-86 (citing I.C. § 28-2-607(3)).
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particular purpose under I.C. § 28-2-315, because Harry’s Dairy was relying on Hay Now’s
expertise, not Mr. Good’s skill or judgment. R. Vol. II, p. 583. But, the district court held there
were issues of fact related to the implied warrant of merchantability under I.C. § 28-2-314,
because there was an issue of fact related to whether the pre-purchase testing excluded mold. R.
Vol. II, pp. 584-85.
On reconsideration, Mr. Good argued that the implied warranty of merchantability was
excluded because Harry’s Dairy could have and should have tested for mold. R. Vol. II, pp. 67677. Harry’s Dairy opposed the motion, arguing that the pre-purchase examination was only for
nutritional testing, and in any event, it is impossible to inspect every bale while it is stacked at
the farm, because “[u]ntil the outside bales are removed the tester does not have access to the
bales on the inside of the stack.” R. Vol. II, p. 696. The district court, on reconsideration,
improperly weighed the factual evidence, and found that “Harry’s Dairy was given the
opportunity to inspect, and ought to have discovered the mold issues, if they existed.” R. Vol. II,
p. 845.
Under I.C. § 28–2–315, an implied warranty of fitness arises when the buyer “is relying
on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.” (emphasis added.) I.C. § 282-314 governs the implied warranty of merchantability: “Unless excluded or modified, a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Id. I.C. § 28-2-316(3)(b) further provides that:
“When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or
model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
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with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him.” Id. Under this provision, “an examination will be effective to exclude warranties only if it
occurred before the contract was made and only if it is of such a nature that it ought to reveal the
defects of which the buyer subsequently complains.” Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129, 135,
910 P.2d 801, 807 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Further, “latent defects that are not
discoverable by the pre-contract examination are not excluded by terms of I.C. § 28-2316(3)(b).” Id. at 135, 910 P.2d 807.
In Whitehouse, the plaintiffs purchased a mare that they intended to use in a horse
breeding business. Id. at 132, 910 P.2d at 804. At the time of purchase, a veterinarian examined
the mare to determine if she was pregnant. Id. After purchase, the plaintiffs attempted to breed
the mare, but she failed to become pregnant. Id. A subsequent examination showed that she had a
susceptibility to a uterine infection that prevents conception. Id. The district court held that the
defendant had breached the implied warranties. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that
while the plaintiffs did not rely upon the defendant to select the particular mare, they did rely on
the defendant “to furnish a mare suitable for the particular purpose of breeding.” Id. at 134, 910
P.2d at 806. Therefore the implied warranty of fitness arose under I.C. § 28-2-315.
Further, the court held that the pre-purchase veterinarian examination of the mare did not
exclude the implied warranties. Id. at 135, 910 P.2d at 807. The examination was only to
determine whether the mare was pregnant, and “[t]here is no evidence in the record that such a
pregnancy examination ought to have revealed the mare’s susceptibility to uterine infections that
occur only upon breeding.” Id. The court noted that latent defects that are not discoverable by the
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pre-purchase examination are not included. Id. And, official comment 8 provides: “A
professional buyer examining a product in his field will be held to have assumed the risk as to all
defects which a professional in the field ought to observe, while a nonprofessional buyer will be
held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe.”
I.C. § 28-2-316, cmt. 8.
Here, there are issues of fact regarding whether the implied warranties apply. As to the
implied warranty of fitness, Mr. Good argued that Harry’s Dairy relied on Hay Now, not Mr.
Good, to furnish suitable hay. R. Vol. II, p. 583. But, nothing precludes Harry’s Dairy from also
relying on Mr. Good (and his status as a hay grower) in supplying suitable goods. The purchasers
in Whitehouse relied on themselves to choose a mare with suitable bloodlines, but they also
relied on the seller to produce a mare suitable to breeding. Harry’s Dairy may have relied on Hay
Now for nutritional testing, but ultimately relied on Mr. Good to provide non-moldy hay, as was
industry standard. At the very least, whether the warranty of fitness attaches is a question for the
trier of fact.
Further, there are issues of fact regarding whether either implied warranty survived the
pre-purchase examination. There is no dispute that Hay Now tested for nutritional value not
mold. The fact that Harry’s Dairy had an opportunity to sample the hay does not negate the
warranties. No pre-contract test was done to determine whether there was mold, and a matter of
custom, hay is not tested for mold. Rather, the industry standard is that when mold is found, the
seller keeps the moldy hay and the non-moldy hay is purchased. (R. Vol. II, p. 536). Even Mr.
Good’s hay dealer testified that it was not his practice to submit hay samples to be tested for
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mold. R. Vol. I, p. 128. And, Harry’s Dairy provided evidence that mold is a latent defect that
cannot be fully seen until a bale is broken up, and internal bales within a stack cannot be
analyzed at the time of purchase unless the outer bales are removed. R. Vol. II, p. 714, L. 3. So,
the implied warranties related to mold should survive the pre-purchase nutritional testing. At the
very least, there is an issue of fact regarding whether Harry Dairy should have tested for mold.
Additionally, whether Harry’s Dairy notified Mr. Good in time of the breach, entitling
Harry’s Dairy to damages, is an issue of fact for trial. Harry’s Dairy presented evidence that it
informed Mr. Good of the mold problem at least four times—when the December 2015 load was
returned, when Ms. Cummins went to the property to observe hay being loaded, when the March
2016 load was returned, and in the April 2016 emails and letters. Whether these amount to
notification within a reasonable time under I.C. § 28-2-602(3)(a) is a question of fact. Id.
(“where a tender has been accepted, the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach of be barred from any remedy. .
. .”) If so, Harry’s Dairy is entitled to damages under I.C. § 28-2-715(2)(b) for breach of the
implied warranty. The district court was correct when it originally decided that “[w]hen Harry’s
Dairy actually gave notice of mold and whether it occurred within a reasonable time are both
questions for a jury to decide.” R. Vol. II, p. 586.
D.

The Jury’s Verdict Awarding Damages to Mr. Good is Not Supported by
Substantial and Competent Evidence.
Even if it were proper for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Mr.

Good on liability, Mr. Good’s evidence of damages at trial failed. Mr. Good’s damages
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testimony was based on a number he read from a document (not admitted into evidence) that his
counsel provided. Further, Mr. Good failed to prove that the hay sold was the Harry’s Dairy hay,
or that the hay sales were commercially reasonable. Without substantial and competent evidence
of identification to the contract and commercial reasonability, Mr. Good was not entitled to
damages under I.C. § 28-2-706.
1.

The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish damages because
Mr. Good’s testimony was mere conjecture, based entirely on a single flawed
document.

Idaho law is well established that all damages must be proved with reasonable certainty.
See Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 361, 386 P.3d 496, 502 (2016).
Although reasonable certainty does not require “absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude”
the factfinder “may not determine damages by mere speculation and guesswork, and there must
be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the factfinder can calculate
the amount of damages.” Id. (citations omitted). Under Idaho law, damage awards based upon
speculation and conjecture are prohibited. Id.
During trial, Mr. Good was called to testify about the damages he sustained from Harry’s
Dairy’s alleged breach. Mr. Good testified that in an attempt to mitigate damages, he resold hay
to Bob Barnes Trucking and Felix Anchustegui Trucking (“Anchustegui”), at a price
substantially lower than the price called for in the parties’ agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 106, L. 22-25,
p. 107, L. 1-2. While on the stand, Mr. Good was unable to remember how much he resold the
hay for. Id. Mr. Good’s counsel sought to refresh Mr. Good’s recollection with a document (the
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“Damages Exhibit”), which was labeled as “Plaintiffs Ex. 21,” but which was never admitted
into evidence. Tr. Vol. I, p. 62 (transcript p. 110, L. 8-13).
On its face, the Damages Exhibit purports to be a compilation of the sales Mr. Good
made to Barnes and Anchustegui. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 21. The Damages Exhibit apparently
created by Mr. Good’s counsel summarizes the date, the amount in tons, and the price of hay that
was sold. Id. The Damages Exhibit further provides a “Grand Total” of $130,034.91, which
purports to be the total amount Mr. Good received from Barnes and Anchustegui to offset his
damages, for a total damages of $144,186.60. Id. Immediately after reviewing this document,
Mr. Good testified that he recovered $130,034.91 from the sales to Barnes and Anchustegui, and
that based on this offset amount, he was damaged in the amount of $144,185.60. Tr. Vol. I, p. 62
(transcript p. 110, L 8-20). 10
Counsel for Harry’s Dairy cross-examined Plaintiff about his memory of his purported
sales to Barnes and Anchustegui. Specifically, he questioned Mr. Good as to why there was no
documentary or other real evidence of his sales to Anchustegui. Tr. Vol. I, p. 76 (transcript p.
168, L. 2 through transcript p. 169, L. 13.) During the relevant time period there were only four
load tickets, which added together, amounted to only 100 tons of hay. Id. In fact, the Damages
Exhibit from which Mr. Good based his damages testimony suggests that Mr. Good sold

10

Upon closer review, by adding the numbers provided in the “Total Price” column of
the Damages Exhibit, the total offset price adds up to $152,827.90, which is $22,792.99 more
than the $130,034.91 total supplied by the Damages Exhibit. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 21. Using
the correctly calculated amounts, the total damage number should have been $121,393.60, not
$144,186.60.
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approximately 1,104.2 tons of hay to Anchustegui which, when added to the total sales to
Barnes, amounted to nearly 700 tons more than called for in the agreement between the parties.
See Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 21. Critically, Mr. Good failed to introduce any invoices, weigh
tickets, or other documents into evidence, rendering that portion of the damage award pure
speculation.
Mr. Good’s conclusory testimony as to his damages, which was plainly based on the
Damages Exhibit, is little more than Mr. Good’s counsel testifying and is insufficient to warrant
the jury’s verdict for a number of reasons. Mr. Good had no independent knowledge of the
damages amounts. Mr. Good did not introduce any load tickets, invoices, or documentary
evidence that supported the Anchustegui deliveries. Mr. Good also admitted that he had refused
to provide his own bank records in discovery so Harry’s Dairy had no means to verify the
claimed sales to Anchustegui. Mr. Good even acknowledged a lack of personal knowledge and
had his memory refreshed with a compilation exhibit that was never introduced and was not
supported by record evidence. And, the Damages Exhibit does not even add up and is internally
flawed as it plainly miscalculates the total “offset” price Mr. Good purported to recover from his
sales to Barnes and Anchustegui.
Under Idaho law, “the factfinder may not determine damages by mere speculation and
guesswork and there must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the
factfinder can calculate the amount of damages.” See Eagle Equity Fund, LLC, 161 Idaho at 361,
386 P.3d at 502. The jury’s verdict must be vacated because its decision rested exclusively on
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Mr. Good’s speculative testimony derived from an unadmitted, inadmissible, unverifiable, and
flawed document.
2.

The evidence is insufficient to show the hay sold to Barnes and Anchustegui
was the Harry’s Dairy hay.

As noted above, the jury awarded damages to Mr. Good under I.C. § 28-2-706. To
qualify for the § 28-2-706 damages, Mr. Good has the burden of demonstrating that: (1) he
provided the requisite notice prior to selling the goods; (2) he resold the goods that were
reasonably identified to the contract; and (3) that the resale, including the terms, method, and
manner of the resale, was commercially reasonable. Id. A seller’s failure to sufficiently
demonstrate it complied with the requirements of Section 2-706 prohibits the seller from
obtaining the damages in that section. See I.C. § 28-2-206 cmt. 2. According to Official
Comment 2 to the UCC, if the seller cannot prove it complied with the requirements of § 2-706,
the seller is relegated to the damages provisions of § 28-2-708. Id.
At trial, Mr. Good summarily testified that the hay he sold to Barnes and Anchustegui
was identified as hay to the contract. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61 (transcript p. 106, L. 18-25, p. 107, L. 1-3).
Mr. Good’s testimony is against the clear weight of the other evidence presented at trial. The
evidence presented at trial, including the very Damages Exhibit on which Mr. Good based his
testimony, demonstrates the hay he sold to Barnes and Anchustegui was not reasonably
identified to the contract.
During trial, counsel for Harry’s Dairy elicited testimony from Bob Barnes and from Mr.
Good that Barnes had regularly purchased hay from Mr. Good before, right up until Barnes
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purportedly purchased hay identified to the contract. E.g., Tr. Vol. I, p. 61, L. 15-20. The record
establishes that Mr. Barnes was buying from Mr. Good regardless of the Harry’s Dairy contract.
Furthermore, the Damages Exhibit used to refresh Mr. Good’s recollection suggests that the hay
subject to the contract was commingled with Mr. Good’s other hay—the total amount of hay sold
to Barnes and Anchustegui amounts to approximately 2,944.59 tons, nearly 800 more tons of hay
than the amount of hay remaining for resale under the contract. See Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 21.
Excluding the tons the document identifies as “not part of offset,” the total tonnage still adds up
to 2,387.49 tons, representing an additional 200 tons that Mr. Good purportedly identified as hay
subject to the contract. Id.
Mr. Good’s trial testimony, which was based on the unreliable and miscalculated
Damages Exhibit, is insufficient to demonstrate the hay sold to Barnes and Anchustegui was the
hay identified to the contract. To the contrary, the Damages Exhibit demonstrates that Mr. Good
commingled the hay to the contract with his other hay, and that sales made to Barnes and
Anchustegui were made without sufficiently identifying the hay as subject to the contract. Mr.
Good failed to meet his burden in demonstrating the hay identified to the Agreement was the hay
sold to Barnes and Anchustegui. The jury’s finding in this regard is not support by substantial
and competent evidence.
3.

Mr. Good failed to present substantial and competent evidence that the sales
to Barnes and Anchustegui were commercially reasonable and made in good
faith.

As stated above, to qualify for the remedies provided in I.C. § 28-2-706, the seller has the
burden of showing the sale was commercially reasonable in every aspect, including the method,
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manner, time, and terms of the sale. See I.C. § 28-2-706(2). Official Comment 2 to Section 2706 provides that it “enables the seller to resell in accordance with reasonable commercial
practices so as to realize as high a price as possible in the circumstances.” I.C. § 28-2-706 cmt. 2.
Mr. Good failed to present substantial and competent evidence of commercial
reasonability. First, Mr. Good failed to present any testimony or documentary evidence with
regard to the sales to Anchustegui. Mr. Good offered no evidence of when the sales to
Anchustegui took place, where the sales took place, how the parties arrived at the sale price of
$70.00 per ton, and what other efforts Mr. Good took to resell the hay before selling to
Anchustegui. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61 (transcript p. 107, L. 1-3); p. 76 (transcript p. 168, L. 2-18). The
absence of evidence cannot amount to substantial and competent evidence of damages.
Second, the little evidence Mr. Good did proffer at trial is insufficient to show that Mr.
Good fulfilled his duty to realize as high price as possible for the hay under the circumstances,
with regard to both the Barnes and Anchustegui transactions. After receiving Mr. Good’s notice
of his intent to resell in April 2016, Harry’s Dairy offered to take delivery of, and pay the full
agreement price of $128 per ton for all remaining marketable hay. Tr. Vol. I, p. 116 (transcript p.
327, L. 8-12). Despite the offer, Mr. Good and his counsel unjustifiably refused to allow Harry’s
Dairy to inspect the remaining 2,000 tons of hay. Mr. Good offered no credible reason for his
refusal to allow Harry’s Dairy to inspect and purchase the remaining hay. Instead, Mr. Good
immediately began selling the hay to Barnes and Anchustegui for rock bottom prices. Under
these circumstances, Mr. Good’s refusal to allow Harry’s Dairy to purchase the hay at the full
Agreement price, and thereby realize as high a price as possible for the hay, was at best
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commercially unreasonable, and at worst was a deliberate and intentional act of bad faith to
increase his damages and harm Harry’s Dairy by simultaneously depriving Harry’s Dairy of the
benefit of conforming hay and creating unnecessary damage.
The fact that Mr. Good failed to offer any evidence that his sales to Anchustegui were
commercially reasonable deprives him of any remedy under I.C. § 28-2-207. Furthermore, the
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate Mr. Good acted reasonably and in good faith in selling
the hay to Barnes and Anchustegui for less than half the contract price, when in fact, Harry’s
Dairy offered to purchase all remaining marketable hay for the full purchase price under the
contract. Mr. Good’s failure to present substantial and competent evidence that he sold the hay in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner deprives him of an award of damages under
§ 2-706, and mandates that this Court vacate the jury’s award.
E.

The District Court Erred in Awarding Mr. Good Fees and Costs and Prejudgment
Interest.
Where one issue on appeal is intimately connected with another part appealed from, “a

reversal of that part would require a reconsideration of the whole case in the court below. . . .”
Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 291, 824 P.2d 841, 866 (1991)
(quoting Gonzales v. R.J. Novick Constr. Co., Inc., 575 P.2d 1190, 1194 (S.C. Cal. 1978)). In
particular, an attorney fee award connected with a reversed judgment must also be reversed.
Marty v. Bainter, 727 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
The award or prejudgment interest (R. at 1151) and the order awarding fees and costs (R.
at 1155-57) are predicated upon a judgment that the Court should reverse. Therefore, the Court
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must also reverse the award of prejudgment interest and order for fees and costs in favor of Mr.
Good.
F.

Harry’s Dairy is Entitled to Fees and Costs on Appeal.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates that the courts award attorney fees to the prevailing

party in a civil action involving a “commercial transaction.” Climax, LLC v. Snake River
Oncology of E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791, 798, 241 P.3d 964, 971 (2010). Mr. Good was
awarded fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) at the district court. R. at 1155-57. Harry’s Dairy
requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41 and under Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3) (commercial transaction) as the prevailing party on appeal, in the event this Court
does not remand for a trial on the merits but directs judgment in favor of Harry’s Dairy. See
Climax, at id. (declining to award fees under § 12–120(3) where award of summary judgment
was reversed and case was remanded for further proceedings).
V.

CONCLUSION

Harry’s Dairy maintains that the district court improperly made numerous factual
determinations on summary judgment. Harry’s Dairy respectfully requests this Court reverse the
summary judgment decision of the district court, and remand for a trial on the merits on no fewer
than the following twenty-one issues of fact:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Whether the contract was an installment contract;
Whether the installments were nonconforming due to mold;
Whether the moldy installments substantially impaired the contract;
Whether Harry’s Dairy made a justified demand for adequate assurances;
Whether Harry’s Dairy notified Mr. Good of cancellation within a reasonable
time;
Whether Harry’s Dairy is entitled to damages for cover hay;
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Whether Harry’s Dairy’s various communications with Mr. Good amount to
sufficient rejections of the remaining 2,000 tons;
Whether Harry’s Dairy’s obligation to reject was even triggered without a postpurchase inspection;
Whether the rejections were timely;
What a reasonable time to haul hay under the contract was;
Whether Harry’s Dairy failed to haul within a reasonable time;
Whether Harry’s Dairy had failed to pay for certain loads;
Whether the failure to pay was a substantial impairment of the contract;
Whether the failure to pre-pay in thirds was waived by the course of dealing;
Whether the failure to pre-pay in thirds was a substantial impairment of the
contract;
Whether Mr. Good had provided proper notice before resale;
Whether Mr. Good had made an express warranty;
Whether implied warranties attached to the contract;
Whether the implied warranties survived the pre-purchase examination;
Whether Harry’s Dairy had provided timely notice of breach of warranty;
Whether Harry’s Dairy was entitled to damages for breach of warranty.

If the Court declines to reverse the award of summary judgment to allow for trial on these
issues, Harry’s Dairy requests the Court vacate the jury’s award and direct a retrial on damages.
DATED: March 19, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

/s/ Bradley J. Dixon
Bradley J. Dixon
Kersti H. Kennedy
Attorneys for Harry’s Dairy, LLC
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